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(c)2000 Douglas Walton
Nielsen's paper has shown how Sidgwick was a man ahead of his time, whose
concerns are familiar and resonant to those of us now working in
argumentation and informal logic. Nielsen's explanation of Sidgwick's work in
practical logic shows how Sidgwick's ideas were not only ahead of their time,
but out of step with developments in logic during and after his lifetime. The
explosion of work in mathematical (formal) logic around the beginning of the
twentieth century eclipsed the pragmatic concerns of Sidgwick and the few
contemporaries of his, like FCS Schiller (1912), who were interested in the
uses of argumentation, as opposed to its formal representation, abstracted
from contexts of use. We can see now why Sidgwick's work was ignored by
most of his contemporaries, and then fell into obscurity. I thought for quite a
while I was the only person on the planet interested in Sidgwick and his work.
Now it is extremely welcome to find someone who has gone into much more
depth than I could ever hope to do, in studying Sidgwick's life and his
contributions to argumentation theory. I look forward to a continuation of this
research on Sidgwick's life and philosophical contributions. And I agree with
Nielsen that it will reveal to everyone that Sidgwick was a highly important
precursor to the recent work in argumentation and informal logic studies. There
is much I could say about many aspects of Nielsen's paper, but I will confine my
comments to the two basic points I think are of key importance - the principle of
access and the rogative approach.
The Principle of Access
Sidgwick's principle of access tells us that when we attempt to criticize another
person's argumentation, the only evidence we have access to are the natural
language formulations of that person. The problem, as Nielsen points out, is
that the corpus of this person's natural language formulations in any given case
can be complex, and difficult to make sense of. What the person has said may
be unclear, ambiguous, evasive, and incomplete. In some cases, an arguer
may be purposefully trying to deceive us by using tricky tactics called fallacies.
The problem, as Sidgwick clearly saw, is not so much one of formalization, but
one of interpreting a natural language text of discourse in some supposed
context of use. Thus Sidgwick was right to warn, as shown by Nielsen, that the
real problems to be concerned about are those of unfair interpretation, and
faulty criticism based on that unfair or unwarranted interpretation. But then the
problem is - how do you, in some objective manner, interpret a natural
language text of discourse in a given case? This is the famous problem of how
to "deconstruct" a person's text of discourse in a real case of argumentation.
Nielsen shows that Sidgwick's answer to this fundamental question lies in his
rogative logic, which is based on the necessity of a dialogical approach to
argument criticism. According to the rogative approach, pinning down a fallacy
or criticism in a given case is not a matter of exact calculation, but a matter of
guesswork. Immediately, many people, especially formal logicians and
analytical philosophers will throw up their hands and say, "See, I told you so.
There's no exact method of calculation whereby you can prove that the
argument is this thing or that thing." Guesswork is taken to be opposed to
logic, because guesswork is not exact. While there is something to be said for
this objection, the problem is that it misses the most important point. Intelligent
guesswork, of the kind we are talking about, can be based on verifiable
evidence. In some cases, the evidence can be definitive, even though in other
cases, the evidence is inconclusive, or there is not enough of it to arrive at
other than a conditional judgment (hypothesis).
It is natural for me to see Sidgwick as anticipating the dialectical approach to
argument criticism advocated in (Walton and Krabbe, 1995), which takes
commitment in dialogue as the central concept needed in criticizing any actual
case of an argument. What we need to do, in evaluating the argumentation in
any specific case, is to assemble the textual evidence in the case, and
interpret what the arguer is supposedly saying in light of a normative model of
dialogue. The normative model represents the supposed context of use of the
argument. Using such a normative model, we can then look at the text of
discourse (critically but fairly), and use that textual and contextual evidence as
a basis for constructing hypotheses or intelligent guesses about what the
arguer's commitments are, as expressed by the arguments, or other moves in
the dialogues she has put forth in the case. Sometimes the evidence is quite
clear and definitive. If the arguer asserts "Bill Clinton is President of the USA.",
and does not subsequently retract that commitment, then we can quite
definitely say that this arguer is committed to the proposition that Bill Clinton is
President of the USA. But notoriously, in other cases, it can be very hard to tell
what a person's commitments are, or may be fairly said to be, based on the
evidence of what she said in the text of discourse we have as evidence.
The important thing however is that in all such cases, there is evidence that can
be used to support or refute claims about what an arguer can fairly be said to
be committed to, as a definite set of propositions in a given case. It is no
longer just a matter of my word against yours, in the new dialectical theory of
argumentation. It's not that there aren't borderline cases, and exquisitely
difficult cases, demanding a high level of natural language skills to sort out. The
point is that there are objective criteria for collecting and evaluating the
evidence in a given case. Sidgwick saw this possibility already, and the need
of it to have any kind of practical logic. His principle of access pointed the way
to the dialectical approach that has now become the structural tool for
evaluating arguments in modern argumentation theory.
The Rogative Approach
Nielsen shows how the problem of the application of logic confronted by
Sidgwick led to his distinctive rogative approach, an approach that is a
forerunner to the commitment-based structures of dialogue constructed by
Hamblin (1970) and others. Nielsen shows how the rogative approach has five
distinctive characteristics.
1. Arguments or assertions are clarified through critical questioning.
2. The use of an expression is "recommended", not "insisted on".
3. Criticisms have the form of objections rather than refutations.
4. There is an openness to "further clarifications".
5. The assertor has final say on what he "actually meant to assert".
These five characteristics of the rogative approach foreshadow Hamblin's use
of commitment and the device of critical questions used by Arthur Hastings
(1963), the Amsterdam School (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992),
Kienpointner (1992) and other proponents of the new approach to
argumentation theory and informal logic. The notion of commitment is rogative.
An arguer's commitments are the propositions that she has gone on record as
having accepted, as far as can be determined form the text and context of what
she actually said. But commitments can be retracted. They can be clarified.
They can be revised. Such retractions and clarifications can be made by
continuing a dialogue, if it is possible to do so. The notion of critical
questioning is also rogative. The goal of practical logic is (generally speaking)
not to decisively refute an arguer, but to find the weakest points in her
argument that are open to critical questioning. The aim is to pose objections or
criticisms of a kind that can be answered in a continuation of dialogue. The
aim is "critical" in the positive sense. It is not to embarrass or humiliate an
opponent, by making him look foolish. It is to find the weakest points in his
argument by asking the appropriate critical questions. Then by discussing
these critical questions, the original arguer can not only improve his argument
and make it stronger, but can gain insight into aspects of it that might not have
occurred to him before.
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